

Unwanted Allies: Koreans as Enemy Aliens in World War II

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Koreans arriving in Hawai'i in the early 1900s brought with them a deeply ingrained dislike of the Japanese. The historical roots of their animosity extended at least to the end of the 16th Century, when Japanese invaders devastated much of the Korean peninsula. Within the lifetimes of some of the early immigrants, the Japanese had used gunboat diplomacy to force upon Korea its first Western-style treaty; had fought China on Korean soil in order to wrest Korea from its place in the traditional Sinocentric international order; had tried to impose major reforms on the Korean government; and had engineered the murder of a Korean queen. In 1905, Japan established a protectorate over a Korean government that was too weak to resist and in 1910 finally snuffed out the existence of Korea as an independent nation.

Few Koreans accepted the legitimacy of Japanese rule over the peninsula, and the oppressiveness of the colonial regime only fortified in most the desire to restore independence. This Koreans attempted to achieve through an active, but largely ineffectual, independence movement in China, Siberia, and the United States. In Hawai'i, hostility was deepened by resentment over the evident rise of Japanese influence in the islands and, Koreans claimed, their infliction of the same kind of abuse and discrimination that Koreans suffered under the Japanese at home.

Thus, it is unlikely that any group welcomed the outbreak of the Pacific war on December 7, 1941, as did the Koreans. In Korean eyes, the war brought promise of retribution upon Japan for her long and deliberate aggression and hope that the government of Korea would soon revert to Korean hands.

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In these circumstances, many Koreans in Hawai'i were stunned to find that they were, because of the Japanese seizure of their homeland, regarded as enemy aliens and restricted in some of the same ways that alien Japanese were. Even Americans of Korean ancestry, while free of the legal limitations placed on their noncitizen parents, felt a measure of discrimination because of the status of their elders.

KOREANS IN HAWAII ON THE EVE OF THE WAR

Koreans had arrived in Hawai'i in numbers between 1903 and 1905, when some 7,000 men, women, and children answered the call of labor recruiters for the sugar plantations. The Japanese blocked this migration in 1905. Thereafter the number of Koreans arriving in Hawai'i dwindled, varying from as few as two in 1909 to as many as 116 in 1917, many of these being "picture brides."¹ Some who came did not remain, of course, and by the eve of World War II, the Korean community numbered only 6,851, or 1.6 percent of the territory's population. Eighty percent of them lived on Oahu.²

Although brought to the islands to be plantation workers, relatively few of the immigrants were experienced in agriculture. About 14 percent are said to have been farmers; the rest had been laborers, soldiers, government clerks, policemen, miners, woodcutters, domestic servants, or students, or considered themselves political refugees. The majority were young men between the ages of 20 and 30.³ As might be expected, they moved steadily away from the plantations and into other pursuits, so that by the 1930s only some 500 Koreans remained in the employ of the sugar growers. Others had established themselves in the professions and in small businesses, most notably as tailors, retail dealers, shoemakers, carpenters, machinists, and dockworkers.⁴

Time, law, and the pattern of immigration produced distinct cleavages in attitudes and interests among the Koreans in Hawai'i. Under U.S. naturalization laws, Asian immigrants were ineligible for citizenship, but their children born in Hawai'i became American citizens at birth.⁵ In 1940, 2,390 of the Koreans living in the Islands were aliens ineligible for citizenship, while the remaining 4,461 were native-born citizens. Age differences also affected attitudes and aspirations: nearly 60 percent of the Korean Americans in Hawai'i were 18 or younger, while 80 percent of their noncitizen elders were more than 45 years of age.⁶ The Koreans themselves recognized that

there were generational differences in attitudes and that the main interests of those holding American citizenship lay with the United States and not with Korea.⁷

These differences were reflected in the leadership of the civic and patriotic organizations formed among the Koreans, a leadership dominated by the older, noncitizen generation. It was they who spoke out on matters related to Korea, and it was they who did most to nurture hostility toward the Japanese.⁸ Interviews with older Koreans and observers of Korean affairs during the first year of the war uniformly revealed a "consistently antagonistic and suspicious attitude toward . . . alien and citizen Japanese alike. . . ."⁹ Even the intense personal rivalries that were the hallmark of Korean politics did nothing to disrupt unanimity on this issue.

Young Korean Americans, on the other hand, were not so uniform in their views. Most showed no special affection for the Japanese, but neither were their attitudes marked by the bitterness that characterized those of their parents. Yet when the occasion called for it they made their opposition to Japan clear, as in their response to suggestions that they might, as a result of Japanese rule in Korea, possess dual nationality or owe some allegiance to Japan.¹⁰

The primary outlet for anti-Japanese sentiment was participation in organizations such as the Kungmin-hoe (Korean National Association), Tongji-hoe (Comrades Society), Sino-Korean People's League, Korean Independence Party, and Korean Women's Relief Society. Although these organizations were often bitterly divided over leadership, personalities, and tactics, they were united in their central concern, the restoration of Korean independence, and this preoccupation, more than anything else, held together the small Korean community.¹¹

These organizations carried on such essentially negative activities as anti-Japanese agitation, as well as more positive pursuits such as securing permission for Koreans to register as Koreans, rather than as Japanese subjects, under the Alien Registration Act of 1940.¹² Their influence was most evident in their ability to raise money to finance Washington lobbyists and to support the so-called Korean Provisional Government in China.¹³

As the threat of war in the Far East grew at the end of the 1930s, the pace of such activities quickened, and interest in the Korean independence movement intensified. One sign of this was the formation in Honolulu in April 1941 of the United Korean Committee in America as a means to focus the activities of the various

Hawai'i and mainland groups on the common goal of restoring a free Korea. When war finally came in December 1941, it was widely viewed by Koreans as the beginning of the road to liberation—a natural, and expected, culmination of Japan's aggression and a validation of the Korean assessment of the Japanese people.¹⁴

WAR AND MARTIAL LAW IN HAWAI'I

With their reputation as outspoken critics of Japan and amid their optimism about an early liberation of Korea, probably none of the Koreans in Hawai'i foresaw the extent to which they would be caught in the web of security measures that enmeshed the islands immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Acting on plans built on a fear of espionage and sabotage by members of Hawai'i's large population of Japanese ancestry, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, commander of the Army's Hawaiian Department, established martial law on the afternoon of December 7, 1941, and assumed full authority over civilian affairs. Short and his successors, adopting the title "military governor," remained in control with only grudging surrender of authority to civil officials until October 1944, when martial law was revoked.¹⁵

The war meant restrictions and deprivations for all of Hawai'i's people. General orders issued by the military governor controlled everything from traffic regulations and interisland travel to garbage collection and dogs. For Japanese, they were especially fearful times. Within three days, the Army had detained 482 persons, most of them Japanese whose loyalty was suspect. In the months that followed, 1,875 residents of Japanese ancestry were sent to the mainland for internment.¹⁶

Along with the Japanese, alien Koreans in Hawai'i had begun to feel the weight of legal restrictions even before the opening attack of the war. On July 26, 1941, the assets of Japanese nationals in the United States had been frozen by presidential order. Controls were tightened further after the beginning of hostilities, and nationals of countries at war with the United States were permitted to continue commercial activities only under a licensing system. The first general license issued under this system in Hawai'i allowed "normal activities" but forbade such things as buying and selling real property and securities, capital transactions, and "unusual" accumulations of inventory. A second general license restricted bank withdrawals to \$200 per month for living expenses, but no more than \$50 could be withdrawn

in a single week. A third license granted during December 1941 authorized payment of wages, salaries, and commissions to enemy aliens, but required that amounts over \$200 per month be deposited in blocked accounts.¹⁷

Also of great impact on the daily lives of those affected was the policy toward alien Japanese promulgated the day after the Pearl Harbor attack. The policy, contained in General Orders No. 5, did not mention Koreans specifically, but military authorities regarded alien Koreans as subjects of Japan and therefore bound by the same restrictions. The order prohibited possession of such things as firearms and other weapons, shortwave radios, and cameras. It also outlawed writing, publishing, or printing attacks or threats on the government or its policies, and required those covered to obtain permission from the Army provost marshal before traveling or changing residence or working place. Ten days later, the list of proscribed articles was enlarged, and enemy aliens were directed to carry on their persons the certificates that had been issued to them under the Alien Registration Act of 1940.¹⁸

Although they could go about normal activities without special permission during the day, aliens of enemy nationality were required to be off the streets during the hours of blackout, which began earlier than the curfew for the general population.¹⁹

Such restrictions were not generally imposed on Koreans on the mainland. Department of Justice regulations that limited the activities of alien Japanese in the continental United States specifically exempted Koreans. The same was true of the regulations governing the enemy alien registration program set up in January 1942.²⁰ Once martial law was declared in Hawai'i, however, the Justice Department had no authority in the islands, and the treatment of Koreans was at the pleasure of the military governor.

To be sure, some regulations were not rigidly enforced. Alien Koreans were allowed to work in some areas where alien Japanese were not. Liquor licenses were granted to Koreans while denied to Japanese. Some Koreans were said to have been allowed to ignore the ban on possession of shortwave radios and cameras. There clearly was a tacit understanding that for some purposes Koreans were to be distinguished from alien Japanese, but these exceptions were not stated in any of the published regulations, and many restrictions were in fact enforced.²¹

In addition to the restrictive curfew and financial controls, Koreans were not free to change residences or jobs without permis-

sion. In some cases, Koreans were denied permission to travel among the islands by air because of their enemy-alien status.²² A prominent Korean physician, Y.C. Yang (later Republic of Korea ambassador to the United States), volunteered for the Army immediately after the first attack, was accepted and commissioned, and worked for a number of days without compensation before being dismissed when it was realized that he was an alien.²³ The right of Koreans to receive the benefits of insurance coverage appears not to have been confirmed until 1943, and Koreans were discriminated against in the purchase of drugs and medical supplies until July 1943.²⁴ In at least one case, a Korean was apprehended by military intelligence officers for distributing leaflets alleged to be creating unrest and confusion by showing a lack of unity among the Korean people.²⁵

A particularly embittering experience occurred in March 1942, when alien Koreans working on defense projects were suddenly required to exchange their white-bordered identification badges for black-bordered badges of the type previously issued only to Japanese and used to restrict the wearer's movements within defense areas. The protests of the workers won only a small concession: the words "I am Korean" were stamped across the bottom of their new badges.²⁶

In these confusing circumstances, Koreans naturally wanted a definitive clarification of their status. But there was more involved than merely obtaining certain knowledge as to which rules would apply and which would not. Treating Koreans as subjects of Japan struck cruelly at the Korean's pride in his national identity, his pride in the Korean struggle against Japanese aggression, and his sense of allegiance to his adopted homeland. How could there be any question of Korean loyalties in a war between the United States and Japan? As one Korean wrote to the editor of the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*:

Of course, we Koreans do not worry much about going to bed early or stay in the house after blackout time in the nights, as we are all hard working people and need rest and good sleep, but what we are greatly concerned about is that we are classified as ENEMY aliens.

Japanese say Koreans are Number One enemy to Japan, and our American friends put us on the enemy side, while we are trying to show our loyalty. . . . It is really hard to understand.²⁷

The classification of their elders as enemy aliens inevitably touched the lives of younger Koreans, as well. One Korean American told of discrimination by his employer and described himself as "heart sick and sore":

I act, speak and think like an American. . . . I never thought of myself as anything but an American. My parents have always taught my sister and I to be good Americans. And for themselves they always thought of the United States as their liberator. . . . Why should the alien Koreans be classified as enemies and let them pass the taint to their children, when they hate the Japs and taught their children to hate the Japs?²⁸

In the absence of official recognition of their loyalty, Koreans in Hawai'i did their best to maintain the distinction between themselves and the Japanese in the public eye. They carried special identification cards and buttons prepared by organizations such as the United Korean Committee, and traditional Korean-style dresses began appearing more frequently.²⁹ At the same time, leaders of the Korean community began a campaign to bring about a change in their legal status.

THE CAMPAIGN FOR A CHANGE OF STATUS

The campaign to be freed of the enemy-alien label included letters and cables to public officials, petitions, newspaper editorials, and personal representations. This effort began immediately after the outbreak of the war and reached a climax in the spring of 1943 in a well-publicized case in which a Korean civic leader was arrested for violation of the curfew regulations. The campaign brought the plight of Koreans to public attention and made the authorities aware of the intensity of Korean desires, but it did not achieve its major aim, the exemption of Koreans from enemy-alien controls.

When General Orders No. 5 appeared on December 8, 1941, Koreans immediately wondered about their status under martial law. Won Soon Lee, chairman of the United Korean Committee, raised the issue on December 10 in a letter to General Short, who referred the matter to intelligence and legal officers.³⁰

Staff memoranda prepared in the judge advocate's office and the executive office of the military governor agreed that under international law Koreans had become Japanese subjects by virtue of the annexation of Korea. The Immigration and Naturalization Office in Honolulu had taken this position for years, and Koreans traveling from Hawai'i to Korea had been required to have Japanese passports. There were considerations that might make it advantageous to overlook this technicality. For example, longtime Hawai'i residents, including federal officials, considered Koreans to be militantly anti-Japanese and believed they would work easily with other ethnic groups and would remain aloof from the Japanese. But there were

negative factors as well, and one in particular that seems consistently to have undergirded military attitudes toward Koreans was stated explicitly: it was claimed to be the consensus of Hawaii residents that "as individuals Koreans are shift, dishonest, tricky and liars in business." In the end, the recommendation was to treat Koreans as enemy aliens for the moment and buck the question to Washington.³¹

This recommendation was accepted as policy, even though the considerations on which it was based were quite legalistic and might easily have been discounted, as was the case on the mainland.³²

While waiting for a local policy, the United Korean Committee approached the Department of State, linking Korean status to the question of American recognition of the independence of Korea and of a Korean government in exile. A cable sent to Secretary of State Cordell Hull on December 16 asked for clarification of the situation and pointed out that most of the alien Koreans in Hawai'i had left Korea before the Japanese annexation and had never submitted to Japanese authority. A subsequent cable on January 16, 1942, and a letter the following day emphasized the injustice that would be done if Koreans were treated as Japanese subjects in the registration of enemy aliens ordered by presidential proclamation. The letter appealed for some such designation as "friendly aliens" so that Koreans might be spared the "undeserved stigma of an enemy at war with the United States."³³

The intercession of Hawai'i's delegate to Congress, Samuel Wilder King, also was sought, and King called for both reclassification of Korean aliens and formal recognition of a Korean government in exile.³⁴

The State Department was not in a position to change the status of Koreans in Hawai'i and was not persuaded of the value of recognizing a government in exile, and so the appeals were turned aside with noncommittal replies and references to the Justice Department, which was responsible for alien registration and control programs.³⁵ The Justice Department did grant exemptions to those in the continental United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, but its regulations had little meaning for Koreans in Hawai'i. Once the territorial government had passed to Army control, neither the State Department nor the Justice Department had much influence on affairs in Hawai'i.³⁶

Although the United Korean Committee continued to maintain that the State Department was responsible for decisions regarding Korean status, it began directing more attention toward Secretary

of War Henry L. Stimson and Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons, who had replaced Short as Army commander in Hawai'i.³⁷ The War Department gave assurances that it would apply in Hawai'i the same registration procedures adopted on the mainland by the Justice Department, and since the mainland procedures exempted Koreans, the registration crisis dissipated.³⁸ In actuality, the status question was merely sidestepped. The military decided that another registration program in Hawai'i was superfluous: a registration of all persons in the territory had been started, all enemy aliens had been ordered to carry the certificates issued them under the 1940 registration act, and military intelligence agencies were already keeping extensive files on enemy aliens.³⁹

Another channel for Korean pressure was the program conducted by the Public Morale Section in the Territorial Office of Civilian Defense, which organized committees of each ethnic group as a focus of expressions of loyalty to the United States.⁴⁰ As part of this effort, the Morale Section compiled a brief report on the Korean organizations in the territory in late December and invited a number of Korean leaders to a meeting on January 13, 1942, to discuss formation of a Korean committee. A second meeting was held January 16 to request a report on Korean activities and to name the Korean Executive Committee, whose ten members were selected from a larger list submitted by the United Korean Committee.⁴¹

The Korean Executive Committee organized itself the following day, choosing J.K. Dunn as chairman and Nodie K. Sohn as secretary, and by January 20 had submitted the requested report on Korean activities.⁴²

At a third meeting, held January 29, the seven committee members present unanimously agreed that the greatest need of Koreans in Hawai'i was clarification of their legal status. The committee pointed out that Koreans were being deterred from contributing to the war effort through purchase of defense bonds because any bonds they bought were being classified as enemy alien property and impounded.⁴³

A report on Korean attitudes submitted after this meeting stressed Korean loyalty and the desire to participate in the war effort and played down hostility toward the Japanese in Hawai'i. It also contained a plea for reclassification and suggested lifting the freeze on the funds of alien Koreans as a first step toward reclassification.⁴⁴

After a month and a half of working with the Korean Executive

Committee, Gordon Bowles of the Morale Section judged Korean leaders to be relatively unconcerned about other sectors of the community and about morale matters. Rather, they were concentrating on agitation for recognition of the Korean Provisional Government and other activities that would publicize the cause of Korean independence. "The adult Koreans are interested first of all in the liberation of their land," Bowles wrote. "They are only secondarily interested in America. As long as helping America will help Korea, they will do what they can." He suggested that the Koreans wanted a change of status and lifting of the financial freeze more for the attention they would bring to the Korean cause than for the improved conditions they would create.⁴⁵

Despite Bowles's cynicism, the Morale Section on March 16, 1942, prepared a memorandum recommending that alien Koreans be officially classified as "friendly aliens." The memorandum pointed out that the Japanese government itself distinguished between those of Korean and Japanese ancestry and discriminated against the former. This could be a convenient basis for the proposed classification, and there seemed to be no means by which Japan could benefit from it. The memorandum predicted that the change would dispell the feeling of injustice harbored by Koreans and would result in more enthusiastic support of the war effort.⁴⁶ A suggested draft of a new general order on the status of Koreans was prepared the following day, and on March 19 another Morale Section memorandum referred to an imminent relaxation of financial controls and asked whether a general order could not also be issued changing Koreans from "enemy" to "friendly" aliens. This memorandum took particular note of problems that had been arising concerning alien Koreans working in defense-related areas such as the waterfront.⁴⁷

These proposals evidently stemmed both from the contacts made through the Korean Executive Committee and from a separate plea from the United Korean Committee, which prepared a paper emphasizing the cultural and political distinctions between the Korean and Japanese people. The paper said Koreans were not disgruntled by restrictions necessary for the territory's security but could be expected to participate even more in defense work if "the revolting technicality" of being classified as Japanese subjects were changed. It expressed appreciation for the extralegal privileges already granted, which constituted a kind of unofficial recognition, but declared that "to be continuously placed in the ranks of the enemy aliens is frankly mentally damaging."⁴⁸

There were in the minds of military authorities, however, more compelling reasons for maintaining the status quo, and these requests did not lead to the desired change of status.

The relaxation of financial controls did provide something of a boost, though. This occurred on March 21, when Governor Joseph B. Poindexter signed an order granting Koreans the status of "generally licensed nationals." The main effects of this were to allow business to be transacted freely without special licenses and to permit withdrawal of any amounts desired from bank accounts.⁴⁹

While this lifted morale, it was still short of the desired formal acceptance of Koreans as allies in the war against the Axis powers, as is evident from a petition addressed to General Emmons by the United Korean Committee in June. The petition recited the highlights of the Korean anti-Japanese struggle since 1905 and noted the privileges already extended to Koreans without damage to the war effort or to security. What was desired now, the petition said, was formal recognition of Koreans as "friendly aliens." Army intelligence officers recommended, however, that the Koreans be told that the State Department had jurisdiction in the matter.⁵⁰

Korean leaders also attempted to build wider support through public relations activities, particularly through the English-language columns of the *Korean National Herald-Pacific Weekly*, a newspaper published in Honolulu by the Kungmin-hoe and Tongji-hoe. The English section of the paper was written to present the Korean position to readers outside the Korean community and was circulated among officials whose duties touched on Korean affairs.⁵¹

A long column in the newspaper on February 11, 1942, laid out the bases for Korean claims to friendly-alien status and argued that even though barred from naturalization, Koreans had been in every respect loyal to American principles and institutions and had by every means shown themselves to be enemies of Japan.⁵²

More than a year later, when the issue remained unresolved, the *Korean National Herald-Pacific Weekly* editorialized:

In spite of all our strenuous efforts to get away from that hateful appellation, a Japanese subject or an enemy alien, that name is repeatedly tagged onto us by this and that authority, totally against our will. Is there in this world a worse Jap hater than a Korean? The most ready answer from all those who know anything about those two peoples would be an emphatic no! . . .

The reason why some authorities insist on pushing a friend, of however meager means away into the category of an enemy is quite beyond the grasp of the unsophisticated mind of a Korean. . . . The Koreans are willing to do anything within their power to get rid of this hideous and tormenting tag. . . . Were not all American people or their forebears once fugitive from some form of tyranny themselves?⁵³

At the same time, Koreans attempted to build their image as a cooperative ally through participation in defense-related activities. They submitted recommendations on the defense of the territory⁵⁴ and gave assurances, both privately and in published statements, that despite the intensity of their feelings, they would refrain from inflammatory attacks on Japanese residents.⁵⁵ They also made financial contributions to the war effort. A special program held in the spring of 1942 netted \$1,105.90 for the American Red Cross, and an eight-month "Korean Victory Drive" in 1943 raised \$26,265.35, which was sent to President Roosevelt for use in prosecuting the war.⁵⁶

After public attention was focused on the Korean status question by the Sohn case in the spring of 1943 (discussed below), the Koreans also received editorial support from Honolulu's major daily newspapers.

Calling the situation "an injustice and a tragedy," the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* observed that Koreans were being "stigmatized by inclusion with the people who have proved their worst enemies, their most ruthless exploiters, their most implacable oppressors . . . it is outrageous that Koreans should continue to be treated as enemy aliens." On another occasion, the paper called the classification of Koreans "a legalistic interpretation which needs to be knocked out, and knocked out quickly."⁵⁷

The *Honolulu Advertiser*, though supportive, was less forthrightly so. It excused the military government from responsibility for the situation and suggested that Congress take up the matter, counseling Koreans meanwhile to "bear their cross with all possible patience, finding what comfort they can in the knowledge that American sympathy is with them." Another editorial suggested that Koreans, because of their own political infighting, might themselves be responsible for their predicament.⁵⁸

Another aspect of the campaign for reclassification was the lobbying carried on in Washington. Syngman Rhee, a longtime resident of Hawai'i and later first president of the Republic of Korea, was the best known of the Korean lobbyists, but there were others as well, including J. K. Dunn of the United Korean Committee and Kilsoo K. Haan of the Sino-Korean People's League. Rhee sought early in the war to get better treatment for Koreans in Hawai'i. On March 30, 1942, he complained to Secretary of War Stimson that the restrictions imposed in Hawai'i were inconsistent with the regulations adopted by the attorney general. Stimson replied a month

later, saying field commanders had been directed to exempt from enemy-alien restrictions those Koreans who met the criteria of the attorney general's regulations.⁵⁹ Rhee apparently considered the status question settled, but, in fact, these orders applied only to Koreans in military service and resulted in no change in the treatment of civilian Koreans in Hawai'i.

The failure of all these endeavors to bring about a change in policy is indicated by the absence of any exemption for Koreans in the new enemy-alien regulations issued in March 1943 when the authority of the civil government was partially restored and a new set of general orders promulgated.⁶⁰ Memoranda exchanged shortly afterward show that this was not an oversight and that the impetus for maintaining the status quo came from intelligence officers, who recommended that "in the interests of the internal security" Koreans should continue to be classified as enemy aliens, but that restrictions on their movements and activities should be "moderated to the maximum possible consistent with good judgment and fairness."⁶¹

Soon after this affirmation of the existing policy, the issue received its greatest public exposure as a result of the arrest of a Korean civic leader, Syung Woo Sohn, for violation of the curfew for enemy aliens. Much of that exposure was the result of the politics of the Korean independence movement.

Sohn was 59 years old, the owner of a North King Street shoe repair business, and had come to Hawai'i in 1905. He had been active in Korean independence activities in Hawai'i and at the time of his arrest was president of the Hawai'i chapter of the Tongji-hoe, an organization formed in the 1920s to support Syngman Rhee. Sohn's wife, Nodie K. Sohn, had served as superintendent of the Korean Christian Institute, with which Rhee was associated, and as an officer of the Tongji-hoe and was known as an intimate friend of Rhee's.⁶²

On the evening of March 28, 1943, Sohn's car stalled in the 1600 block of Liliha Street, preventing him from reaching his home on Kilohana Street in Kalihi Valley before the beginning of blackout at 7:45 p.m. He was arrested by two Honolulu policemen at 8:15 p.m., charged with violating the regulations prohibiting enemy aliens from being abroad during blackout, and released on \$50 bail. The case received no publicity until April 30, when Sohn appeared to answer the charge in the provost court.⁶³

During the hearing, Sohn's attorney, Willson C. Moore, argued that Sohn deserved to be treated as a friendly alien because he had

left Korea on a Korean passport before the Japanese annexation, which, in any case, had been a illegal seizure, and had made himself known as an enemy of Japan through his participation in Korean patriotic organizations. He had remained an alien only because American law denied him the privilege of naturalization. The provost judge, Lieutenant Colonel Moe D. Baroff, expressed sympathy with the predicament of Sohn and other alien Koreans but maintained that he was bound by the general orders of the military governor and had no choice but to find Sohn guilty. He fined Sohn \$10 with payment suspended.⁶⁴

Sohn petitioned General Emmons for a review of his conviction, basing his appeal largely on Secretary of War Stimson's April 30, 1942, letter to Rhee concerning the attorney general's exemption of Koreans from enemy-alien restrictions. Other appeals in support of Sohn were made to the executive officer of the military government. These, too, relied heavily on Stimson's letter.⁶⁵

Emmons was not persuaded by Sohn's petition, with its 12 pages of case law citations, and declined to reverse the findings of the provost court, in effect declaring that Koreans would continue to be treated as enemy aliens under the curfew regulations.⁶⁶

But for the politics of the Korean independence movement and Sohn's close link with Rhee, the matter might have been forgotten.⁶⁷ Sohn's wife sought Rhee's intervention immediately after her husband's arrest, however, and Rhee responded with a promise to take the status issue to Congress. "US seems to be at war with Korea rather than Japan," he wrote to her in April. "We are determined to find out who is running this country, the Americans or the Japs."⁶⁸

Rhee at that moment faced a serious challenge to his domination of the independence movement in the United States. Months of friction over his position vis-à-vis the United Korean Committee had led to suspension of that organization's financial support for his Washington office (the Korean Commission) and to a serious effort, especially among Korean leaders in Los Angeles, to force Rhee aside in favor of new leadership. Analysts of Korean affairs viewed Rhee's interest in the Sohn case in this context and interpreted his intervention as an attempt to solidify his position in Hawai'i, where he still enjoyed the support of the Tongji-hoe. Whether this was the main consideration or not, the Sohn case did present an opportunity to raise again the question of American recognition of the Korean Provisional Government.⁶⁹

Rhee was quickly in touch with Hawai'i's congressional delegate,

Joseph R. Farrington, and officers in the War Department. He also wired Governor Ingram M. Stainback and William Borthwick, the territorial tax commissioner, a longtime friend. After Sohn's conviction in the provost court, Rhee complained to Secretary Stimson and to President Roosevelt, asking Roosevelt to intervene in the case.⁷⁰

Farrington joined Rhee's appeals, writing to Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy on May 25 to ask whether the Sohn conviction would be allowed to stand and, if so, how this could be reconciled with the treatment of Koreans as friendly aliens in so many other matters.⁷¹

Letters were also being written by Rhee's main rival in Washington, Kilsoo Haan, and, at Haan's behest, by Senator Guy M. Gillette, an Iowa Democrat whom Haan had been cultivating.⁷²

Farrington's inquiry was answered almost immediately by an aide to McCloy, Colonel William P. Scobey, who indicated that the status of Koreans in Hawai'i was a familiar subject. While the War Department recognized the attorney general's rulings, he said, the local commander in Hawai'i had determined that "because of military necessity" alien Koreans should continue to be classified as enemy aliens. He said, however, that he was not at liberty to explain why this was insisted upon. Scobey suggested that Farrington "quiet the fears of Koreans by informing them that the Hawaiian Department does and will give careful consideration to all individual cases so that no injustice will be occasioned to any loyal Korean."⁷³

Rhee's letter to Stimson and that of Gillette to Roosevelt prompted a review of the situation by the War Department's Military Intelligence Division, the results of which were summed up in a memorandum prepared on June 29, 1943. The review found that Stimson's letter to Rhee in 1942 had been misleading in that it implied that field commanders had been ordered to observe the Justice Department regulations regarding all Korean aliens when, in fact, the War Department policy concerned only those in military service. The review also included a query to the Hawaiian Department asking for specific information on the Sohn case and an explanation of the policy in force. The upshot of the review was acceptance of the existing policy and a recommendation that it be continued.⁷⁴

This review was the basis for a reply sent to Rhee over Stimson's signature on July 7 in which the various privileges extended to Koreans in Hawai'i were recited once more and assurances were given that the War Department valued the cooperation of Koreans and their opposition to Japan. Nevertheless, because of "military

necessity" and in the interest of "internal security" it was considered essential that the few remaining restrictions be enforced.⁷⁵

Rhee also received a reply from Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., in behalf of Roosevelt. Writing on July 12, Berle denied Rhee's claim that the authorities in Hawai'i had violated laws or regulations in holding Sohn to be an enemy alien, and he emphasized the "special conditions prevailing in Honolulu and nearby areas" that made it essential to allow the local commander considerable discretion.⁷⁶

Haan's protest to the president was answered by Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., who had replaced Emmons on June 1. The gist of his reply was the same: the finding in the Sohn case was consistent with the policy that had always been followed in Hawai'i; the "very satisfactory" relations between Koreans and the military government had made it possible to grant privileges not extended to some others; and the cooperative spirit of Koreans was recognized and appreciated.⁷⁷

Despite the flurry of activity that surrounded the Sohn case, then, there was no apparent movement toward a change of status. After General Emmons's refusal to reverse Sohn's conviction, the *Korean National Herald-Pacific Weekly* observed:

Koreans of Hawaii, disappointed and depressed at the thought of being classified as enemy aliens by military authorities here, are in a state of mental agony and suffering. . . . Korean national conscience is clear beyond doubt no matter what the technicality of law interpretation may class them. . . . No matter how much the Koreans bemoan the enemy alien status, let's prove ourselves worthy of being called the American ally. Let us work harder and sweat more to accelerate the war efforts. . . . The American sense of justice and fairness will eventually prevail. . . .⁷⁸

The application of enemy-alien curfew regulations to Koreans—which had come to symbolize enemy-alien status itself—was finally dropped with little fanfare several months later when, on December 4, 1943, the military government promulgated General Orders No. 45, exempting Koreans from the enemy-alien curfew restrictions. The change followed closely the publication on December 1 of the Cairo Declaration, in which the chief executives of the United States, Great Britain, and China announced their determination that Korea should in due course become independent. According to an official Army history, it was in keeping with this declaration that the curfew restriction was lifted.⁷⁹

The Army policy toward Koreans in Hawaii was based on considerations of internal security, but the documents available give little evidence for the belief that Koreans threatened the security of Hawaii or the United States.

References to national security—without directly accusing any Korean—appear often in government statements. Stimson, for example, referred to a need for intensive surveillance because Axis sympathizers were thought to be operating in the guise of refugees and foreign nationals.⁸⁰

When asked for a statement of policy in June 1943, General Richardson, commander of the Hawaiian Department, contended that although it had seemed unnecessary to hold alien Koreans to all of the original limitations placed on enemy aliens, "nevertheless, considerations of internal security . . . made it necessary to treat Koreans as enemy aliens for purposes of certain restrictions," namely, the curfew and restrictions on possession of explosives, arms, and ammunition. He said this policy was based on careful consideration by the Army and Navy intelligence agencies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.⁸¹

Some light is shed on the role of Army intelligence by the official war history of the Army command in Hawaii. The military intelligence contact officer, who functioned as a liaison and intelligence-collection agent, suggested in September 1942 that the status of Koreans be redefined, but the military governor decided that "since no policy had been established by the War Department each Korean case would be considered individually." When the question came up again in March 1943, however, the contact officer recommended continuing to make exceptions in specific cases but without any change in stated policy.⁸²

Even less information is available about the roles of naval intelligence and the FBI. According to General Richardson, the naval intelligence office in Hawaii was "particularly insistent" in May 1943 that alien Koreans in Hawaii should not be regarded as friendly aliens. The FBI, on the other hand, declined to make any recommendation at that time because the Justice Department had earlier ruled that Koreans should be considered friendly aliens.⁸³

The Army counter-intelligence office, naval intelligence, and the FBI worked together closely on all matters touching on internal security, espionage, and subversive activities in Hawaii, and in all

probability there were no significant differences of opinion among the officers of these three agencies. This is suggested by the reports of Alfred M. Tozzer, an anthropologist who was wartime head of the Honolulu branch of the Office of Strategic Services. Although not involved in internal security, Tozzer frequently communicated with the intelligence staffs and cultivated acquaintances in the Korean community because of his agency's interest in the Korean independence movement. His reports consistently lump together G-2 (military intelligence), the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the FBI in reporting the suspicions of local officials.⁸⁴

What, then, were the specific reasons for considering Koreans a threat to security? Richardson's policy statement prepared for the War Department listed six of "the more significant reasons":

(1) Many alien Koreans were believed to have ties to Japan through families or relatives living in Korea or Japan; many of them were said to have made trips to Japan and Korea;

(2) Many Koreans were said to "have connections which might allow them to sell their services to the highest bidder." In particular, it was said that Kilsoo Haan was "known to have a private pipeline of information from Tokyo which could be assumed to work in both directions." Haan was reported to have worked as an informant for both the Japanese consulate in Honolulu and for the American military intelligence services, making him highly suspect;

(3) Korean nationalist leaders were said to "appear to be opportunists who are more interested in personal aggrandizement than they are in organizing a movement representing a sincere expression of a people who desire to maintain their own national integrity;"

(4) It was contended that language problems would make the work of counter-intelligence officers and police more difficult if alien Koreans were classified as friendly aliens. "It is almost impossible to distinguish between Koreans and Japanese by sight alone, and Japanese who speak Korean might try to represent themselves as Koreans," it was argued;

(5) A change of status for Koreans "might provide an opening wedge for the Formosans, Okinawans, and other colonists not of pure Japanese blood;"

(6) Existing restrictions were not severe and affected only about 2,500 people, but to exempt these people would unduly strain intelligence agencies by making it necessary to process them through alien hearing boards, as had been done with many Japanese, and this, in turn, would only "invite further unrest and give their leaders a stronger platform for protest."⁸⁵

This list hardly gives an impression of a compelling threat to the security of the islands. Indeed, it is as weighted with political and bureaucratic considerations as with genuine concern about internal security. The only person named as a possible threat, Kilsoo Haan, was not even in Hawai'i during the war. Although he had a small following in Hawai'i, he was as widely distrusted among Koreans as he was among American officials. Though investigated by the FBI, no charges were brought against him, nor was it ever proved that he actually had the network of secret agents he claimed to command.⁸⁶

Tozzer's reports to Washington, which at one time or another reported most of the concerns listed above, likewise reflect an absence of firm evidence of Korean disloyalty or espionage. His reports indicated that prior to December 7, 1941, the Japanese consulate had had on its payroll three Koreans, one of whom denied it. Besides these three, there was the case of a Korean Buddhist priest who was said to be a "good Japanese scholar" and "a likely tool." The FBI investigated him but "found nothing definite." These were the most specific allegations Tozzer could report. In sum, there was suspicion but not a single case in which investigation had warranted the arrest of a Korean.⁸⁷

In the development of a policy toward alien Koreans, these suspicions, nebulous as they were, and a cynical view of the aims of Korean nationalist leaders were combined with an awareness that the Koreans in Hawai'i were a small minority with neither significant influence nor the power to challenge successfully any policy adopted. Moreover, the Army was well aware that this small minority was splintered by political differences that made it unlikely that it could mount a united action that might force revision of the policy before Army leaders were ready to make changes.⁸⁸

If the reasons underlying the restrictive policy toward alien Koreans were no more substantial than this evidence suggests, then one can fairly conclude that the Korean community was not treated in accordance with professed American ideals of individual respon-

sibility and presumption of innocence. To be sure, the magnitude of the injury done to them does not approach that done to the thousands of Japanese who were confined to concentration camps during the war. The injury was psychological rather than physical or material and seems not to have been long-lasting. Koreans who remember the war years in Hawai'i tend to regard the restrictions as trivial and probably necessary in the circumstances, but these are not the Koreans of an older generation who had such a great psychological, emotional stake in being recognized as equals in the battle against Japan, and whose great nationalistic pride could only be affronted by the policy adopted toward them.

It is easy in retrospect to challenge the necessity of the restrictions, but the times did not admit of a less cautious course of action. As Stanley D. Porteus recalled after the war, the early defeats in Europe generated a pervasive fear of fifth-column activities, and in Hawai'i, as elsewhere, "sabotage became the mouse under the bed, whose presence overshadowed all other dangers."⁸⁹

NOTES

¹ Robert C. Schmitt, *Historical Statistics of Hawaii* (Honolulu: UP of Hawaii, 1977) 100. The early immigration is discussed in detail in Wayne K. Patterson, "The Korean Frontier in America: Immigration to Hawaii, 1896-1910," diss. U of Pennsylvania, 1977. See especially 372-413.

² Erma M. Cull, comp., "The Japanese Population of the Territory of Hawaii—Its Relationship to the War Effort" (Honolulu: Health and Welfare Services, Territorial Office of Defense, 1942), Appendix, microfilm 20, Hawaii War Records Depository (HWRD), U of Hawaii.

³ Bernice B. H. Kim, "The Koreans in Hawaii," Master's thesis, U of Hawaii, 1937: 85-86.

⁴ Lee Houchins and Chang-su Houchins, "The Korean Experience in America, 1903-1924," *Pacific Historical Review*, 43.4 (November 1974): 560-562; William C. Smith, *Americans in Process: A Study of our Citizens of Oriental Ancestry* (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, 1937; rpt. New York, Arno, 1970) 67, 69; Andrew W. Lind, *An Island Community: Ecological Succession in Hawaii* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1938) 322, 324, 326.

⁵ Milton R. Konvitz, *The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1946) 80-88, 96, and 108-110. Two cases in 1921, growing out of legislation enabling certain war veterans to become citizens, affirmed the ineligibility of Koreans for naturalization. See *In re En Sk Song* 271 Fed. 23, and *Petition of Easurk Emsen Charr* 273 Fed. 207. Forty-four Koreans in Hawaii were naturalized under this legislation, but their naturalizations were voided. Romanzo Adams, T. M. Livesay, and E. H. Van Winkle, *The Peoples of Hawaii: A Statistical Study* (Honolulu: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1925) 16. Legislation in the 1930s did extend this privilege to Korean war veterans, but Koreans generally did not become eligible for naturalization until 1952. Easurk Emsen Charr, *The Golden Mountain* (Boston: Forum, 1961) 276-285; H. Brett Melendy, *Asians in America: Filipinos, Koreans, and East Indians* (Boston: Twayne, 1977) 137-138.

- ⁶ Memorandum, R. A. Kinney to Chief, Far Eastern Unit, Military Intelligence Service, 19 March 1943, Regional File, 1933-1944: Korea, Office of the Director of Intelligence (G-2), Records of the War Dept. General and Special Staffs, Record Group 165, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md.: hereafter cited as G-2 Regional File. All archival sources, unless otherwise noted, are in this National Records Center, Suitland, Md.
- ⁷ United Korean Committee in America, *Condensed Reference: Korea and the Pacific War* (Los Angeles: United Korean Committee in America, 1943) 23-25.
- ⁸ Accounts of these organizations are in Warren Y. Kim, *Koreans in America* (Seoul: Po Chin Chai, 1971) and Kingsley K. Lyu, "Korean Nationalist Activities in Hawaii and the Continental United States, 1900-1945," *Amerasia Journal*, 4.1 (1977): 23-90; 4.2 (1977): 53-100.
- ⁹ Lauriel E. Eubank, "The Effects of the First Six Months of World War II on the Attitudes toward the Japanese in Hawaii," master's thesis, U of Hawaii, 1943, 12, 30, 46, and 182.
- ¹⁰ Eubank 12, 53-54, and 182; *HA*, 29 August 1940, 3:1.
- ¹¹ Romanzo Adams, *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii: A Study of the Mutually Conditioned Processes of Acculturation and Amalgamation* (New York: Macmillan, 1937) 188.
- ¹² See, for example, the negative testimony of Kilsoo Haan in U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Hawaii, Statehood for Hawaii: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Hawaii, 75th Cong., 2nd sess., 6-22 October 1937 (Washington: GPO, 1938) 447-468. See also Syngman Rhee, *Japan Inside Out: The Challenge for Today* (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1941) 143.
- ¹³ Chung Song Ahn, "Korean National Association" 75th Anniversary of Korean Immigration to Hawaii, 1903-1978 (Honolulu: 75th Anniversary of Korean Immigration to Hawaii Committee, 1978) 35, claims that the Kungmin-hoe alone contributed \$3,000,000 to the independence movement between 1919 and 1945. The source of this figure is not stated.
- ¹⁴ Kim, *Koreans in America* 135-138; Eubank 56-58.
- ¹⁵ Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, *The Western Hemisphere: Guarding the United States and Its Outposts*. United States Army in World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1964) 199-200. See also George W. Bicknell, "Security Measures in Hawaii During World War II," ms., microfilm 54, HWRD.
- ¹⁶ J. Garner Anthony, *Hawaii Under Army Rule* (Palo Alto: Stanford UP, 1955; rpt. UP of Hawaii, 1975), 13-14; Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild 199, 214. A few of those detained were Germans and Italians; 43 were U.S. citizens. I have seen no indication that any Koreans were taken into custody.
- ¹⁷ Gwenfreed Allen, *Hawaii's War Years, 1941-1945* (Honolulu: U of Hawaii P, 1950) 81-82, 142-143; Eubank 71-72; *HSB*, 9 December 1941, 1:4. General licenses were issued under presidential authority and administered by U.S. Treasury Dept. personnel. See, for example, *Federal Register*, 5.72 (12 April 1940): 1400-1402; 6.146 (29 July 1941): 3715.
- ¹⁸ General Orders No. 5, 8 December 1941, and No. 32, 18 December 1941, HWRD.
- ¹⁹ Initially, the hours of blackout and curfew were both 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. The curfew hour was changed to 9 p.m. in February 1942 and to 10 p.m. in May 1942, remaining the same until the curfew was lifted on July 7, 1945. Blackout hours were soon altered to coincide with the hours of darkness and so varied from month to month. Allen 112-114.

- ²⁰ Dept. of Justice press releases, 26 January 1942, and 9 February 1942; *Los Angeles Times*, 25 January 1942; F. B. Biddle to S. Rhee, 3 February 1942, copy enclosed in memorandum, A. M. Tozzer to W. L. Langer, 15 May 1943, George M. McCune papers, Center for Korean Studies, U of Hawaii; Robert T. Oliver, *Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1954) 180; *Federal Register*, 7.28 (10 February 1942): 844-847, and 7.38 (25 February 1942): 1477-1480. Koreans were excused from surrendering cameras, radios, and other such articles and from restrictions on travel and change of residence. However, they remained subject to arrest and detention without recourse to the courts if this was deemed necessary to national security. According to 1940 figures, there were only 1,711 Koreans on the mainland, 962 of them American-born citizens and 749 aliens.
- ²¹ Eubank 74-75; Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Middle Pacific, "History of United States Army Forces Middle Pacific and Predecessor Commands During World War II, 7 December 1941-2 September 1945," vol. 14, 3105, microfilm 38a, HWRD. Eubank quotes an unnamed Korean publicist as saying there was "what amounts to an unwritten agreement with the officials that the orders are not to apply to Koreans." An unnamed source in the Office of the Military Governor also stated that the rules were not enforced on Koreans.
- ²² Eubank 77-78; "History of U.S. Army Forces Middle Pacific," vol. 14, 3106; E. J. Fitzgerald to military governor, 31 January 1942, OMG 14.31 (Aliens-Koreans) 3, decimal file, 1941-1945, Military Government of Hawaii, Records of United States Army Commands, Record Group 338.
- ²³ W. Borthwick to S. W. King, 26 December 1941, file: Korean Government Recognition, Samuel W. King papers, AH.
- ²⁴ B. Froiseth to members, Hawaii Rating Bureau, 11 January 1943, copy enclosed in A. M. Tozzer to W. L. Langer, 15 May 1943, McCune papers; HSB, 2 July 1943, 1:1.
- ²⁵ J. E. Hoover to A. A. Berle, Jr., 8 September 1942, 894.20211 Haan, Kilsoo/13, decimal file, 1940-1944, General Records of the Dept. of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C.: hereafter referred to as NA.
- ²⁶ Eubank, 85-86.
- ²⁷ HSB, 18 May 1943, 6:2.
- ²⁸ HSB, 27 July 1943, 8:2.
- ²⁹ Eubank 84-85; Kim, *Koreans in America* 139.
- ³⁰ W. C. Phillips to W. S. Lee, 11 December 1941; memorandum, T. H. Green to Capt. Sifdol, 13 December 1941, OMG 014.31 (Aliens-Koreans) 2.
- ³¹ Memoranda, Capt. Sifdol to T. H. Green, undated, and R. B. Griffith to T. H. Green, undated, OMG 014.31 (Aliens-Koreans) 2.
- ³² T. H. Green to W. S. Lee, 19 December 1941, OMG 014.31 (Aliens-Koreans) 1.
- ³³ W. S. Lee to C. Hull, 16 December 1941, and 16 January 1942, copies enclosed in A. M. Tozzer to W. L. Langer, 15 May 1943, McCune papers; W. S. Lee to C. Hull, 17 January 1942, copy in King papers.
- ³⁴ Statement of Samuel W. King, 16 January 1942, and S. W. King to C. Hull, 19 January 1942, King papers.
- ³⁵ H. B. Hoskins to W. S. Lee, 21 January 1942, and 3 February 1942, copies enclosed in A. M. Tozzer to W. L. Langer, 15 May 1943, McCune papers; C. Hull to S. W. King, 29 January 1942, King papers. The State Department was at that time considering recognition of a Korean government in exile but decided against it because of the obvious lack of unity among Korean groups and because none was believed to have any substantial connection with Korean groups inside Korea.

- ³⁶ I have seen no appeals to the Interior Department, which had overseen territorial government before the war and which was the staunchest advocate within the government of restoration of civil rule. See Fred L. Israel, "Military Justice in Hawaii, 1941-1944," *Pacific Historical Review*, 36.3 (August 1967): 243-267; and Anthony 20-33.
- ³⁷ Eubank p. 78; J. K. Dunn to D. C. Emmons, 31 January 1942, and 4 February 1942. OMG 014.31 (Aliens-Koreans) 4.
- ³⁸ S. W. King to United Korean Committee, 2 February 1942, and S. W. King to J. K. Dunn, 5 February 1942, King papers.
- ³⁹ "History of U.S. Army Forces Middle Pacific," vol. 14, 3105.
- ⁴⁰ Public Morale Section, Territorial Office of Civilian Defense, "Recommendations for the Establishment of an Executive Committee for National Groups," 12 January 1942, file K: Korean-War, Hawaii Social Research Laboratory (HSRL), Dept. of Sociology, U of Hawaii; "Tentative Considerations," 22 December 1941, Public Morale Section file, Records of the Territorial Office of Civilian Defense, AH.
- ⁴¹ Public Morale Section, Territorial Office of Civilian Defense, Memo 4, 23 December 1941; untitled memorandum on formation of Korean committee, 13 January 1942; Agenda for Presentation to the Meeting of Korean Leaders to Form a Korean Executive Committee, 16 January 1942, file K: Korean-War, HSRL.
- ⁴² J. K. Dunn to G. T. Bowles, 20 January 1942, confidential file, K-37-I, HSRL. The report attached to this letter lists contributions such as service in kitchens for the Territorial Home Guard, sewing and collection of clothes and money for the Red Cross, purchase of war bonds, and preparation of surgical dressings for the Red Cross.
- ⁴³ Public Morale Section, Territorial Office of Civilian Defense, Agenda for Meeting of the Korean Executive Committee Called by the Public Morale Section, 27 January 1942, file K: Korean-War, HSRL; Minutes of the Meeting of the Korean Executive Committee, Public Morale Section, 29 January 1942, confidential file, K-38-I, HSRL.
- ⁴⁴ *Korean National Herald-Pacific Weekly*, 4 February 1942, 1:3.
- ⁴⁵ Morale Section, Office of the Military Governor, Third Progress Report on Koreans, 5 March 1942, file K: Korean-War, HSRL.
- ⁴⁶ Morale Section, Office of the Military Governor, Memorandum Concerning a Possible Change of Status of Koreans Resident in the Territory of Hawaii, 16 March 1942, file K: Korean-War, HSRL. There was no "friendly aliens" category, but with no recognized Korean government, the terms "ally aliens" and "neutral aliens," applied to some others, seemed inappropriate.
- ⁴⁷ Suggested Draft for a General Order Clarifying the Status of Koreans in the Territory of Hawaii, 17 March 1942; Morale Section, Office of the Military Governor, untitled memorandum, 19 March 1942, file K: Korean-War, HSRL.
- ⁴⁸ United Korean Committee in America, "The Korean Status in the Territory of Hawaii," undated, confidential file, K-42-I, HSRL.
- ⁴⁹ *HSB*, 21 March 1942, 1:1; Eubank 75-77; Joseph B. Poindexter papers, miscellaneous file, 1939-1942: K, AH.
- ⁵⁰ J. K. Dunn to D. C. Emmons, 10 June 1942, OMG 014.31 (Aliens-Koreans) 18.
- ⁵¹ The *Korean National Herald-Pacific Weekly* combined the publications of the Kungmin-hoe and the Tongji-hoe, first appearing 21 January 1942. The combined paper continued until February 1944, when the Tongji-hoe withdrew. Arthur L. Gardner, *The Koreans in Hawaii: An Annotated Bibliography* (Honolulu: Social Science Research Institute, 1970) 39; Eubank 18.
- ⁵² *Korean National Herald-Pacific Weekly*, 11 February 1942.
- ⁵³ *Korean National Herald-Pacific Weekly*, 12 May 1943.

- ⁵⁴ J. K. Dunn to T. H. Green, 7 March 1942, OMG 014.31 (Aliens-Koreans) 8. The United Korean Committee paper, "Korean Observations and Recommendations on American National Defense," urged that Japanese residents be kept under closer surveillance and maintained that, in the event of an invasion, Koreans would be the first to be attacked in any internal uprising by resident Japanese and Japanese Americans.
- ⁵⁵ J. K. Dunn to S. W. King, 20 January 1942, King papers; Resolution of 1 March 1942, copy enclosed with Dunn to King, 7 March 1942, King papers; *HSB*, 27 May 1942, 6:6. Korean charity did not extend, however, to allowing Japanese to use the Korean Christian Church in Honolulu as an evacuation shelter in case of an emergency: Eubank 90-91.
- ⁵⁶ J. K. Dunn to S. W. King, 4 June 1942, King papers; D. H. Chung to R. C. Richardson, Jr., 31 August 1943, Richardson to Chung, 7 September 1943, Richardson to F. D. Roosevelt, 2 September 1943, copies in file 66.07, HWRD. Korean offers of public service began before the outbreak of the war and were not predicated solely on a desire to change their enemy-alien status. See W. S. Lee to L. Petrie, 5 June 1941, T. G. S. Walker to Lee, 1 July 1941, 29 September 1941, and 7 October 1941, Lee to Walker, 29 September 1941, Oahu Major Disaster Council file, HWRD.
- ⁵⁷ *HSB*, 6 May 1943, 8:1; 15 July 1943, 8:1.
- ⁵⁸ *HA*, 17 May 1943, 18:1; 5 June 1943, 14:1; 21 July 1943, 14:1; see also the response of Henry Chung, 15 August 1943, 3:1.
- ⁵⁹ Oliver 188-189. Oliver misdates this exchange to 1943.
- ⁶⁰ See General Orders No. 3 and No. 6, 10 March 1943. HWRD.
- ⁶¹ Memoranda, Office of Military Governor to G-2 Contact Office, 18 March 1943, and Contact Office to Military Intelligence, 22 March 1943, OMG 014.31 (Aliens-Koreans) 26.
- ⁶² *HSB*, 6 January 1960, A-5:1, 31 May 1972, D-14:6; memorandum of telephone conversation with J. K. Dunn, 11 May 1943, McCune papers.
- ⁶³ Provost Court Proceedings in Session [Sohn case], photostatic copy enclosed as exhibit 3 to Korean Commission memorandum on the status of Koreans, 21 October 1943, Joseph R. Farrington papers, 78th Congress—Subject File—1943-1944: Koreans in Hawaii, AH; memorandum, "The Sohn Case and the Status of Koreans in Hawaii," May 13, 1943, 1, McCune papers.
- ⁶⁴ *HSB*, 30 April 1943, 5:8, and 15 May 1943, 8:5. Provost court hearings were summary procedures; see Israel 247-251, and Anthony 15-19. Sohn had requested naturalization twice and had been refused. "History of U.S. Army Forces Middle Pacific," vol. 14, 3107.
- ⁶⁵ *HSB*, 5 May 1943, 5:5; K. B. Dawson to W. R. C. Morrison and Y. K. Kim to Morrison, 6 May 1943, copies enclosed in A. M. Tozzer to W. L. Langer, 15 May 1943, McCune papers; Changsoon Kim to D. C. Emmons, 8 May 1943, OMG 014.31 (Aliens-Koreans) 30. Stimson's letter is quoted in full in Oliver 189.
- ⁶⁶ D. C. Emmons to W. C. Moore, 31 May 1943, OMG 014.31 (Aliens-Koreans) 31; *HSB*, 2 June 1943, 1:4.
- ⁶⁷ Another arrest of a Korean alien for a curfew violation in July elicited more editorial criticism of the Army's policy but otherwise generated little interest. See *HSB*, 14 July 1943, 6:4, 15 July 1943, 8:1; *HA*, 15 July 1943, 9:1, 19 July 1943, 12:2, 21 July 1943, 14:1; memorandum, G. M. McCune to C. F. Remer, 5 August 1943, McCune papers.
- ⁶⁸ S. Rhee to N. K. Sohn, quoted in memorandum, R. B. Hall to W. L. Langer, 30 April 1943, copy in McCune papers; the letter was intercepted by postal censors on April 26. For additional evidence that authorities knew through postal censorship that Rhee was agitating the Sohn incident, see Office of Censorship, District Postal Censor, Honolulu, *General Information Summary*, vol. 2, no. 6 (15-31 March 1943) 24.

- ⁶⁹ Kim, *Koreans in America* 142-145; draft memorandum, May 1943 (by G. M. McCune), "The Sohn Case and the Status of Koreans in Hawaii" 6-7, "Preliminary Report on the Sohn Case" (by G. M. McCune), 17 May 1943, and memorandum, A. M. Tozzer to C. F. Remer, 17 June 1943, McCune papers.
- ⁷⁰ "The Sohn Case and the Status of Koreans in Hawaii" 1; S. Rhee to I. M. Stainback, 6 April 1943, OMG 014.31. (Aliens-Koreans) 26; memorandum, G. V. Strong to chief of staff, War Department, 29 June 1943, decimal file, AG 014.311 (4-30-42), Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1917-, Record Group 407, NA; A. A. Berle, Jr., to S. Rhee, 12 July 1943, copy enclosed in Korean Commission memorandum on the status of Koreans, 21 October 1943, Farrington papers; HA, 13 June 1943, 1:5.
- ⁷¹ J. R. Farrington to J. J. McCloy, 25 May 1943, Farrington papers.
- ⁷² K. K. Haan to F. D. Roosevelt, 8 May 1943, copy in OMG 014.31 (Aliens-Koreans) 33; G. M. Gillette to Roosevelt, 11 May 1943, mimeo copy distributed by Haan in Farrington papers; HSB, 12 May 1943, 5:5, 18 May 1943, 1:4; HA, 19 May 1943, 14:3; J. K. Dunn to W. Y. Kim, 16 June 1943, Warren Y. Kim papers (microfilm copy in possession of Prof. Chong-Sik Lee, U of Pennsylvania).
- ⁷³ W. P. Scobey to J. R. Farrington, 27 May 1943, Farrington papers.
- ⁷⁴ Memorandum, Strong to chief of staff, 29 June 1943, AG 014.311 (4-30-42).
- ⁷⁵ H. L. Stimson to S. Rhee, 7 July 1943, copy in McCune papers.
- ⁷⁶ A. A. Berle, Jr., to S. Rhee, 12 July 1943, copy enclosed as exhibit 4 to Korean Commission memorandum on status of Koreans, 21 October 1943, Farrington papers.
- ⁷⁷ R. C. Richardson, Jr., to K. K. Haan, 25 June 1943, OMG 014.31 (Aliens-Koreans) 33.
- ⁷⁸ *Korean National Herald-Pacific Weekly*, 9 June 1943.
- ⁷⁹ U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The United States and the Korean Problem, Documents, 1943-1953* (Washington: GPO, 1953) 1; "History of U.S. Army Forces Middle Pacific," vol. 14, 3107. I have found no document that fully explains the rationale for the change of policy.
- ⁸⁰ H. L. Stimson to S. Rhee, 2 June 1942, copy enclosed in A. M. Tozzer to W. L. Langer, 15 May 1943, McCune papers.
- ⁸¹ Memorandum, Strong to chief of staff, 29 June 1943, AG 014.311 (4-30-42).
- ⁸² "History of U.S. Army Forces Middle Pacific," vol. 14, 3106-3107.
- ⁸³ Richardson's justification of his policy is appended as Tab I to memorandum, Strong to chief of staff, 29 June 1943, AG 014.311 (4-30-42).
- ⁸⁴ See, for example, Tozzer's telegram to W. J. Donovan, 28 May 1943, and his memoranda to the Far East Division of the OSS, 29 May, 5 June, and 9 July 1943, copies in the McCune papers. See also Bicknell 17-18, 58-59.
- ⁸⁵ Memorandum, Strong to chief of staff, 29 June 1943, tab I, AG 014.311 (4-30-42).
- ⁸⁶ Some glimpses of Haan's curious career may be seen in memorandum, R. A. Kinney to chief, Japan Branch, Military Intelligence Service, 9 June 1943, G-2 Regional File and Resolutions of the Tongji-hoe, Chicago chapter, and J. K. Dunn to K. K. Haan, 5 June 1942, copies in the King papers.
- ⁸⁷ Memorandum, A. M. Tozzer to Far East Division, OSS, 9 July 1943, McCune papers.
- ⁸⁸ For examples of military intelligence reporting on Korean politics in Hawaii, see Annex No. 2, G-2 Periodic Report for the Period Ending 18 July 1942, and memorandum, K. J. Fielder to assistant chief of staff, G-2, War Department, 26 February 1944, G-2 Regional File.
- ⁸⁹ Stanley D. Porteus, *And Blow Not the Trumpet: A Prelude to Peril* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Pacific Books, 1947) 99.